The "tragedy of the commons" as previously stated, is based on a fundamental economic argument that people are rational, individual actors that obtain positive utility of a commons resource. Each user however, incurs negative environmental costs simply because the resource is shared. However, there will always be an incentive for a user to continue using the resource, because the positive utility is greater than the negative environmental impact.
The tragedy is incurred where the critical environmental threshold is reached.
Hardin (1968)
Hardin saw the tragedy of the commons as an inevitable phenomena that might only be escaped with centralized top-down governance and a shift towards private property ownership - people, left to their own rational behaviours, are unable to solve the problem.
Elinor Ostrom (2009 Nobel Prize in Economics) disagreed. A major alternative view to Hardin's approach is the idea of developing a social-ecological system that is self-governing in development and maintenance, which would prevent a system crash.
Struggle is derived from conflicting values/interests, a lack of trust, biophysical limitations and complexity. Rules are generally designed with one set of social, economic, ecological or technological conditions in mind, and will become outdated as these conditions change. Further, the rules applied to one set of conditions are often not applicable to another set. Rules must evolve.
Adaptive governance
Adaptive governance is required in complex systems in order to more efficiently provide information, deal with conflict, provide infrastructure and prepare the system for change.
The Genius of Ted Ames
Ted Ames, a local fisherman, interviewed other retired fishermen, looking over nautical charts. Active fishermen will not divulge their own preferred fishing grounds, but have few reservations talking about where other fishermen go, and retired fishermen have nothing to lose. The triangulation of many data clouds from these fishermen eventually reconstructed a disappeared fishery - 'ghost cod.' This proved that cod did not move freely throughout all grounds, but behave as sub-populations. This implies that to fish out a whole sub-population is to drive it in to local extinction.
This revelation begs the question of how well we actually understand the dynamics of the common-pool resources we use, and it must be remembered tat governance at the wrong scale creates a brittle system.
Gilded Trap
A gilded trap describes the increasing risk in a system of a crash in resource or market that may occur without warning. Social drivers such as population growth or market demand will increase the value of a resource, ergo its development and exploitation also increase. The ecological system will become more fragile, and far less resilient if shocked.
The difference between a trap and gilded trap is that in the former, there is a steady decline from a high social-system benefit to a low one, whilst for the latter the social system-benefit will stagnate for a while at a medium social-system benefit, before crashing very rapidly to a very low social-system benefit. This is far worse, since it can, without warning, devastate the economic system dependent upon it. Consider the island of Nauru, which yielded vast amounts of phosphate, decimated the environment until eventually the carrying capacity of the island dropped to a minimum, and the land could yield nothing.
In context, the coastal marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Maine was exploited by a relatively small, controlled fishery that fished for Atlantic cod. By the 1930's, the introduction of new catch technologies expanded the existing market and dramatically increased yield. A social trap developed as the tragedy of the commons became installed in the system, so that by the 1990's the collapse of coastal predatory finfish stocks were seen. The marine system became vulnerable and dominated by lobster populations, changes that coincided with a higher demand for lobsters. This led to the gilded trap; fishers switched from fishing a variety of stock to exclusively lobster, and this selective process that decimated the local biodiversity is not a series of choices that can be returned from. The Gulf is left with Homarus americanus monoculture, with an economic diversity 70% lower. Current successes derived from inflation-corrected lobster income is counteracted by the increased social and ecological consequences of future declines in lobster populations.
It can be easily seen in this case that collective actions from economically attractive opportunities often outweigh social/ecological risks associated. Strong initial financial gain reinforces the gilded trap for a time, and avoiding or escaping the trap requires managing for increased biological and economic diversity.
The difference between a trap and gilded trap is that in the former, there is a steady decline from a high social-system benefit to a low one, whilst for the latter the social system-benefit will stagnate for a while at a medium social-system benefit, before crashing very rapidly to a very low social-system benefit. This is far worse, since it can, without warning, devastate the economic system dependent upon it. Consider the island of Nauru, which yielded vast amounts of phosphate, decimated the environment until eventually the carrying capacity of the island dropped to a minimum, and the land could yield nothing.
The Gulf of Maine: Gilded Trap
As biodiversity drops, for instance in a fishing area, one more successful species is often targeted e.g. Maine lobster. In Maine, as fisheries biodiversity decreased, the percentage of lobster catches increased exponentially. Social/environmental factors define the options and shape election processes as antecedent conditions, which meet a critical juncture whereby particular options are selected. From there, a structural persistence in these decisions produces and reproduces a socio-ecological trap with a reactive sequence to the situation.In context, the coastal marine ecosystem of the Gulf of Maine was exploited by a relatively small, controlled fishery that fished for Atlantic cod. By the 1930's, the introduction of new catch technologies expanded the existing market and dramatically increased yield. A social trap developed as the tragedy of the commons became installed in the system, so that by the 1990's the collapse of coastal predatory finfish stocks were seen. The marine system became vulnerable and dominated by lobster populations, changes that coincided with a higher demand for lobsters. This led to the gilded trap; fishers switched from fishing a variety of stock to exclusively lobster, and this selective process that decimated the local biodiversity is not a series of choices that can be returned from. The Gulf is left with Homarus americanus monoculture, with an economic diversity 70% lower. Current successes derived from inflation-corrected lobster income is counteracted by the increased social and ecological consequences of future declines in lobster populations.
It can be easily seen in this case that collective actions from economically attractive opportunities often outweigh social/ecological risks associated. Strong initial financial gain reinforces the gilded trap for a time, and avoiding or escaping the trap requires managing for increased biological and economic diversity.
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